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THE OPTION NOT TAKEN: A PROGRESSIVE REPORT ON
CHAPTER 154 OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT
Marianne L. Bellt
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: a defendant has been sentenced to
death and his state appeals have been exhausted.' He has the opportunity
to appeal his sentence in federal court using the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. 2 Unfortunately, he is unsure of the contents of the peti-
tion and the filing deadline. Does he have one year to file the petition or
only six months? The answer to this question turns on whether the state
in which he is imprisoned follows Chapter 153 or Chapter 154 of the
1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).3
Suppose the state asserts that Chapter 154 is applicable because it
has "opted-in" by meeting the chapter's requirements for providing com-
petent representation to capital prisoners in state post-conviction litiga-
tion.4 In exchange, the state claims are expedited, post-conviction
review procedures are restricted, and a six-month statute of limitations
for filing habeas petitions is imposed.5 In reality, however, the state does
not officially appoint counsel until quite some time after the defendant's
t The University of Memphis, B.A., summa cum laude, 1997; Cornell Law School, J.D.
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1 This hypothetical is largely based on an oral argument before the United States
Supreme Court. See Transcript, U.S.S.Ct. at *13-*28, Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740
(1998) (No. 97-391) available in WESTLAW, SCT-ORALARG File No. 14670.
2 See generally LARRY YAcKLE, PoST-CoNvirWoN R.E~mis § 4 (1981) (explaining
what a petition for writ of habeas corpus entails); 1 J. LmIar, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PRACICE AND PROCEDURES § 2.2 (1988); Emanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer
Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REv. 557 (1994). Importantly, state prisoners can use the writ of
habeas corpus because 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996), not the Constitution, allows it.
3 See discussion infra Part I. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (1996) ("A 1-year period
of limitations shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court").
4 See discussion infra Part I (explaining the "quid pro quo" system of Chapter 154
whereby states exchange competent counsel for more efficient review of habeas petitions).
5 See discussion infra Part I. A state is able to gain a six-month statute of limitations
and unitary review procedure by opting-in to Chapter 154.
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state appeals have been exhausted. 6 The defendant then faces two
choices: (1) he may file a "bare bones" pro se habeas corpus petition to
try to make the 180-day limit; or (2) he may wait for counsel to be ap-
pointed and potentially violate the statute of limitation requirement.7
If the defendant decides to file a bare bones petition, the following
scenario emerges. Counsel is appointed two months later. The lawyer is
new to the defendant's case, inexperienced in federal habeas corpus law,
and has few resources to spend.8 When the lawyer tries to amend the
petition, the amendment is not allowed due to strict amendment rules.9
The defendant subsequently loses his habeas petition and is executed
without any meaningful review of his conviction or sentence.
To avoid this outcome and clarify the requirements for habeas peti-
tions, prisoners in several states have filed suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claiming their civil rights have been violated. 10 Prisoners have chal-
lenged federal courts to issue declaratory judgments about whether states
opt-in under Chapter 154.11 For example, in Death Row Prisoners of
Pennsylvania v. Ridge,' 2 the Third Circuit held that prisoners are able to
bring such § 1983 suits to gain declaratory judgments and that the State
of Pennsylvania did not qualify for Chapter 154's benefits. Conversely,
in Booth v. Maryland13 the Fourth Circuit held that a prisoner cannot
bring a § 1983 suit to gain a declaratory judgment.
The United States Supreme Court resolved the circuit split over
prisoners' right to bring § 1983 suits to gain declaratory judgments in
6 See discussion infra Part I. This situation occurs frequently in states that claim to
meet the requirement of Chapter 154.
7 See Ashmus v. Calderon, 123 F.3d 1199 (9' Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Calderon v.
Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998):
Making this choice is not a matter of litigation strategy. It is a matter of life or
death. The State's announced intention [to follow Chapter 154] forces a condemned
inmate without counsel to decide whether to immediately file a bare bones habeas
petition, with no assurance that the district court later will allow an amendment; or to
await the appointment of counsel and, consequently, fail to file a petition within the
180-day period.
Id. at 1205.
8 See discussion infra Parts I and III. Chapter 154 recommends that counsel be new to
the case, since many post-conviction claims attack the ability of trial and appellate counsel.
Furthermore, if the state system to opt-in to Chapter 154 is inadequate, counsel may not be
adequately compensated for investigation and preparation and may not have knowledge of
habeas litigation.
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 2266(3)(B) (1996) ("No amendment to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus under this chapter shall be permitted after the filing of the answer to the applica-
tion, except on the grounds specified in section 2244(b).").
10 See discussion infra Part II; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
11 See discussion infra Part II.
12 948 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 106 F.3d 35 (3d Cir. 1997), overruled by
Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
13 940 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md. 1996), vacated, 112 F.3d 139 (4"' Cir. 1997), aft'd, Calde-
ron v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
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Calderon v. Ashmus. 14 The Court held that prisoners cannot bring
§ 1983 suits, reasoning that the hypothetical dilemma prisoners may face
does not meet the constitutional "case or controversy" requirements of
Article ]lI.15 The Court further held that questions about whether states
meet opt-in requirements must be raised in habeas corpus petitions. 16
However, the problem remains. Even after Ashmus, defendants still face
the question of whether state counsel requirements are sufficient to ob-
tain expedited review and the 180-day time limit promised under Chapter
154.
Part I of this Note will examine the history and language of Chapter
154. Part II will detail the ruling of Ashmus. Part III will report how
states have reacted to the Ashmus ruling by examining recent court deci-
sions from states that claim they have met counsel requirements. Finally,
Part IV will discuss why states have failed to opt-in to Chapter 154,
either by choice or because of inadequate counsel requirements, and the
implications of those failures for the future of Chapter 154.
I. HISTORY AND LANGUAGE OF CHAPTER 154
A. THE POWELL COmmITTEE REPORT
1. Background and Purpose of the Powell Committee
Formed in June 1988 by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases ("Powell Committee"
or "Committee") provided one of the major catalysts for the AEDPA. 17
Rehnquist chose retired Associate Justice Lewis Powell, Jr. to chair the
Committee. Rehnquist also selected four other Committee members:
Chief Judge Clark from the Fifth Circuit; Chief Judge Rodney from the
Eleventh Circuit; District Judge Hodges of Florida; and District Judge
Sanders of Texas. 18 Florida and Texas impose the death penalty fre-
quently, and the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have the largest capital pris-
oner populations in the country; therefore, the selected judges had ample
experience with federal review in capital cases. 19
Rehnquist instructed the Powell Committee to analyze "the neces-
sity and desirability of legislation directed toward avoiding delay and the
lack of finality" in capital cases in which prisoners had been offered
14 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
15 Id. at 745-46.
16 See i at 747; see also U.S. CONST. Art. II; discussion, infra Part TIB.
17 See Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 CraM. L. REP. (BNA) 3239, 3239
(Sept. 27, 1989) [hereinafter "Powell Committee Report"I.
18 See id.
19 See id; see also infra note 147 (pointing out the frequency of executions in Florida and
Texas). Consider, however, that Chief Justice Rehnquist "packed" the Committee with pro-
death penalty members.
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counsel.20 The Committee met six times over fifteen months, listening to
various presentations and requesting written comments from federal and
state prosecutors, groups opposed to "the death penalty, state executives
and legislators and criminal defense and public defender
organizations." 2'
2. Findings of the Committee
The Committee reached three basic conclusions about capital litiga-
tion. First, the Committee found that "unnecessary delay and repetition"
were at the root of many complaints about the system.22 They observed
that several factors contribute to the delay and repetition: (1) coordina-
tion problems between federal and state legal systems result in prisoners
moving back and forth between the systems before exhausting state rem-
edies; (2) constant suits over stays of execution occur because prisoners
have no incentive to initiate and pursue collateral remedies until their
execution dates are set; and (3) the absence of res judicata of a statute of
limitations for habeas corpus petitions allows prisoners to file multiple
petitions, despite rules to curb abuse of the writ and endless filings.23
Second, the Committee stated that the need for competent, compen-
sated counsel is a serious problem with the current system.24 Although
counsel is constitutionally required for trial and direct appeal, states are
not required to appoint counsel for state collateral proceedings, which are
invariably utilized in capital cases.25 Indigent, uneducated prisoners are
therefore abandoned to handle their own complex habeas litigation,
which results in constitutional claims being improperly pled and inade-
quately developed.26 These deficiencies in the state court lead to ineffec-
20 Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3239.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 3239-40.
23 See id.; see also discussion infra Part IV.
24 See Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3240.
25 See id.; see also U.S. CONST. Amend. VI (giving right to counsel for trial); Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (reaffirming that criminal defendants are constitutionally enti-
tled to counsel only for trial and direct appellate review).
26 See Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3240; see also Michael Mello, Facing
Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 513,
548-52 (1988) (citing studies that found the average educational level of death row prisoners is
eight years of education, and the average I.Q. levels in various states range from less than
eighty to eighty-six); Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F. Supp. 1330, 1337-38 (M.D. Fla.) (reporting
that one witness testified "for more than 50 percent of inmates, attempting to read a law book
would be akin to attempting to read a book written in a foreign language"), rev'd on other
grounds, 775 F.2d 1433 (11' h Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 313 (1986). Cf. Personal
Interview with John H. Blume, Habeas Assistance and Training Project Counsel (consultants
to Defender Services Committee of the United States courts); Director, Cornell Death Penalty
Project and Visiting Professor of Law (Nov. 5, 1999) ("It was actually rare for inmates to be
forced to represent themselves. But lawyers were routinely appointed and not paid, given no
funds for experts, and appointed counsel often had no experience.").
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tive and inefficient federal collateral proceedings.27 Qualified counsel is
eventually appointed when execution is imminent; but, by then it is often
too late, as serious constitutional claims may have been waived.
Third, the Committee reported that last-minute litigation poses a
concern in the current system.28 The Committee stated that both judicial
resources and justice are abused when proceedings about constitutional
issues are conducted amidst a looming execution, and when meritless
petitions are filed at the eleventh hour to seek delay.29
3. The Committee's Proposal
To- remedy these problems, the Committee strove to invent a fair
and efficient system that would give petitioners "one complete and fair
course of collateral review in the state and federal system, free from the
time pressure of impending execution, and with the assistance of compe-
tent counsel .... -30 They proposed a quid pro quo plan: if a state enacts
a system, pursuant to binding state law, for the appointment, compensa-
tion, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses for competent coun-
sel to represent indigent capital prisoners in state post-conviction
proceedings, the state can impose a six-month time limit for federal
habeas petitions to be filed and enforce expedited review of petitions.31
The Committee reasoned that this plan would ensure that collateral re-
view would be fair, comprehensive, and result in "capable and commit-
ted advocacy."'32
Thus, rather than command individual states to comply with one
federal system, the Powell Committee provided states both the option to
participate in the quid pro quo plan and the option to customize counsel
systems to their special needs. The Committee contended that by giving
states these choices, federal and state powers would remain balanced. 33
27 See Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3239-40.
28 See id.
29 See id.; see also, e.g., Jane L. McClellan, Stopping the Rush to the Death House:
Third Party Standing in Death-Row Volunteer Cases, 26 Apuz. ST. L. J. 201, 213-14 (1994)
(discussing that eleventh hour appeals are extremely stressful for death-row inmates, who
know that death is impending but are not sure when it will occur).
30 Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3240.
31 See id. at 3241-45.
32 Id. at 3242.
33 It is not surprising that the Powell Committee would recommend such a system since
its founder, Chief Justice Rehnquist, is an avid supporter of federalism. See, e.g. William H.
Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relation-
ships, 78 VA. L. Rnv. 1657 (1992):
'Our Federalism' also requires continued sensitivity so that federal courts do not
cause friction by interfering with the legitimate interests of state court systems ... I
continue to believe the Powell Committee Report strikes a sound balance between
the need for ensuring careful review in the federal courts of a capital defendant's
constitutional claims and the need for the state to carry out the sentence once the
20001
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Specifically, the Committee proposed five new statutes outlining the plan
in detail. These statutes were grouped together as "subchapter B" of
Chapter 153, the law which covers habeas corpus procedures.
4. The Committee's Recommended Statutes
The first statute, § 2256, suggests that the new subchapter will ap-
ply to state capital prisoners and will only be applicable if "a State estab-
lished by rules of its court of last resort or by statute a mechanism for the
appointment, compensation and payment of reasonable litigation ex-
penses of competent counsel in state post-conviction proceedings
brought by indigent prisoners whose capital convictions and sentences
have been upheld on direct appeal to the court of last resort in the State
or have otherwise become final for state law purposes. '34 Furthermore,
§§ 2256(b-d) provide that counsel must be offered to all state prisoners
under capital sentence, standards of competency for the counsel must be
given in the rule or statute, and the appointed counsel must not have
previously represented the prisoner in trial or appeals unless both the
prisoner and counsel specifically ask for representation to be extended to
collateral appeals.35 Significantly, in their comments regarding § 2256,
the Committee stated that the federal judiciary has the final judgment
about the adequacy of a state's counsel appointment system, and capital
prisoners who doubt that the State's system meets the statutory require-
ments can settle their own challenges through litigation.36
The second statute, § 2257, provides for a mandatory stay of execu-
tion if the state invokes the post-conviction review procedures of the sub-
chapter. According to the Committee, the mandatory stay solves
problems caused by numerous prisoners struggling against the state to
gain a stay before any post-conviction review is allowed - deadlines for
stay of execution litigation place "unrealistic demands on judges, law-
yers, and prisoners." The mandatory stay can expire if the prisoner
waives his right to file, does not file a habeas corpus petition by the 180-
federal courts have determined that its imposition was consistent with the federal
Constitution.
Id. at 1657, 59.
34 Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3241.
35 See id. The reason for this basic rule is to avoid conflict of interest problems regard-
ing claims about the performance of trial counsel, which frequently arise in post-conviction
review. See, e.g., Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3242; Colvin-El v. Nuth, 1998
WL 386403, at *2 (D. Md. July 6, 1998) ("[11n order to avoid conflicts of interest with respect
to challenges to the performance of appointed counsel at trial, the attorneys appointed [for
post-conviction litigation] are almost exclusively 'panel' attorneys [classified groups that meet
qualification criteria].").
36 See Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3242. In fact, there has been a great
deal of litigation over whether a state system is adequate to opt-in to Chapter 154, See also
discussion infra Part IV.
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day deadline, or has his petition denied. Thereafter, a stay of execution
or other relief is not allowed unless three conditions are met: (1) the
claim for relief has not been presented in federal and state court because
the state violated the Constitution or federal laws or because the Supreme
Court has recognized a new, retroactive right; (2) the claim is based on
new facts that could not have been reasonably discovered in time for
post-conviction review; and (3) the facts of the claim are sufficient to
undermine a finding of guilt.37 Thus, while § 2257 allows prisoners one
stay of execution, it also makes additional stays and federal review ex-
tremely limited.38
The third statute, § 2258, provides that prisoners can file their fed-
eral habeas petitions up to 180 days after an order is entered appointing
counsel.39 A 60-day extension will be granted only if there is a good
cause showing for counsel's inability to file the petition within 180
days.40 The time limitation does not apply when a petition is pending for
certiorari following state post-conviction review.4' The Committee rea-
soned this section should "cause understandably reluctant state prisoners
to seek post-conviction review when such action may remove the only
obstacle preventing the State from carrying out the death sentence." 42
The fourth statute, § 2259, defines the limited scope of federal
habeas review.43 District courts may only consider federal claims which
were raised and litigated in state courts and have adequate evidentiary
records and findings of fact.44 The court must complete inadequate
records before addressing the merits of the claim.45 These requirements
are analogous to existing law and practice.46 On the other hand, § 2259
states that new claims not previously considered in state court may only
be considered if one of three exceptions applies: (1) the claim is the re-
sult of a state action that violates the Constitution or federal laws; (2) the
claim is the result of a new, retroactive right recognized by the Supreme
Court; or (3) the claim is based on new facts that could not have reason-
37 See id.
38 Id. The Committee determined it was acceptable to impose such strict rules since
"[o]ften, factual guilt is not seriously in dispute" and "the only appropriate exception is when
the new claim goes to underlying guilt or innocence" of the capital prisoner. Id.
39 See Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3244. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 2263(a)
(1996), which states that the statute of limitation should begin running as soon as a prisoner's
conviction is affirmed on direct review). For further discussion, see infra Part IV.
40 See Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3244.
41 See id.
42 Id. (explaining that typically, the only reason for a prisoner to begin post-conviction
review is the scheduling or threat of scheduling an execution date).
43 See Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3245.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 See id.
2000]
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ably been discovered in time to present the claim for state post-convic-
tion review.47
Significantly, this part of the section departs in two ways from the
exhaustion doctrine articulated in Rose v. Lundy.48 First, § 2259 does
not allow prisoners to exhaust a new claim in state court so that it may be
heard in federal court.49 As a result, prisoners may have to comply with
a filing deadline for some claims, even if state litigation has not been
completed on other claims.50 Second, the district court does not have to
exhaust state remedies if one of the exceptions applies; the court is com-
manded to conduct an evidentiary hearing and rule on the new claim.51
Both of these changes were meant to speed up the process.5 2 According
to the Committee, states "would prefer to see post-conviction litigation
go forward in capital cases, even if that entails a minor subordination of
their interest in comity as it is expressed in the exhaustion doctrine. '53
Finally, § 2260 eliminates the requirement that prisoners obtain a
certificate of probable cause for a first appeal in habeas cases; only sec-
ond or successive petitions must have a certificate.54 The Committee
reasoned that state prisoners with one chance to present their habeas peti-
tions should be given one appeal as a matter of right.55
The Powell Committee report was released on September 29,
1989.56
B. CHAPTER 154
1. The Adoption of the Powell Committee Report into the
AEDPA and its Transformation into Chapter 154
The 1996 Congress welcomed the findings of the Powell Commit-
tee. Democrats and Republicans had been debating various habeas
corpus bills for fifty years. 57 However, both sides recognized that there
were problems with delays in habeas litigation and deficiencies in ade-
47 See id.; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining some of the reason-
ing behind the limited exception to the prohibition against additional stays and federal review
in capital cases).
48 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
49 See Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3245.
50 See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 Buri. L. RIv.
381, 387 (1996).
51 See id.
52 See Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3245.
53 Id.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See generally Yackle, supra note 50, at 422-42 (discussing the debate over habeas
corpus reform wherein Democrats fought to retain the strength of the "Great Writ" of habeas
corpus and Republicans proposed extensive reform for prisoner litigation).
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quate counsel for capital prisoners.5 8 Members on both sides desired to
change the current system which some believed decreased Americans'
confidence in the criminal justice system, harmed victims' families, and
diminished prisoners' chances for legitimate appeals.5 9 In fact, the new
Republican Contract with American included a Taking Back Our Streets
Act which maintained that because "thousands upon thousands of frivo-
lous petitions clog the federal district court dockets each year," the limit
to file habeas claims should be one year, reduced to six months for capi-
tal cases.60 Republicans also proposed that federal courts consider fed-
eral habeas petitions within a specific time frame.61 Thus, the time was
right for federal habeas reform and politicians agreed with the Powell
Committee; Congress adopted a majority of the Committee's
recommendations.
On April 26, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Anti-Ter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).62 Clinton, a
"new Democrat," wholeheartedly supported the anti-terrorism provisions
of the bill; he had previously adopted the "get tough on crime" slogan of
the Republicans. 63 Although Clinton expressed serious concern about
the Supreme Court's future interpretations of the new habeas corpus pro-
posals and warned that the AEDPA should not be unfairly read to im-
58 135 CONG. REc. S13471-04 (1989) (statement of Sen. Biden).
59 Id. at S13472; see also HOUSE Comm. ON THE JUDICIARY, 104th Congress, REPORT ON
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REFoRM (Ronald S. Matthias) (Comm. Print 1994), available in
WESTLAW, CONGTMY File No. 14168985 (arguing that crime victims are not receiving
"timely justice" which would give them "closure," and that the large amount of time between
sentencing and execution causes a decrease in the public's faith that justice will be served);
Senate and House Committee News Conference on Webwire-Anti-Terrorism Bill, (April 15,
1996) (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch), 1996 WL 199479 (many people personally affected
by the Oklahoma City bombing were present):
At long last, after more than a decade of effort, we're about to curb these endless,
frivolous, costly appeals of death sentences, and as so many people standing here
with us today know, habeus (sic) reform is the only substantive provision in this bill
that will directly affect the Oklahoma City bombing case.
Id.
60 CoNTRAcr wITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEwT GINGRICH, REP. DICK
ARMEY AND Tm HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 43-44 (Ed Gillespie & Bob
Schellhas eds., 1994).
61 See id. at 43.
62 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. The AEDPA was signed into law eight
days after the one-year anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing.
63 See Remarks By the President, Radio Address to the Nation, WEEKLY CoMP. PRES.
Doc. 1493 (July 16, 1994). The President is quoted as saying:
This crime bill. . . provides tough punishments for violent criminals like "three
strikes and you're out," and provides about $8 billion to build prisons to ensure that
violent criminals can be locked up . . This crime bill will make a real difference
across our country in every neighborhood, every city, every town. It will help to
lower the crime rate. It's what the American people are waiting for.
2000]
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pinge on the vindication of federal rights,64 he ultimately signed the bill
because, "[flor too long, and in too many cases, endless death row ap-
peals have stood in the way of justice being served."' 65 Sections 2256-60
(Subchapter B) became section 107 of the AEDPA, and when the
AEDPA was passed, the statutes were codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-66
and renamed Chapter 154.66
2. The Text of Statutes in Chapter 154
Two of the Committee's recommended statutes were adopted verba-
tim. Section 2256 (appointment of counsel and procedures for appoint-
ment) corresponds exactly with 28 U.S.C. § 2261.67 Section 2257
(mandatory stay of execution given, duration and limits on stays and
treatment of successive petitions) corresponds exactly with 28 U.S.C.
§ 2262.68 However, there were several modifications to the Powell
Committee's other suggestions.
First, 28 U.S.C. § 2263 (discussing the filing of habeas petitions,
time limitations and tolling rules) decreases the amount of time for an
extension to 30 (rather than 60) days as in section 2258.69 Second, 28
U.S.C. § 2264 (discussing the scope of federal review and district court
adjudications) omits the parts of § 2259 which commands courts to "de-
termine the sufficiency of the evidentiary record" and then "conduct any
requested evidentiary hearing necessary to complete the record for
habeas corpus review."70 Third, 28 U.S.C. § 2265 makes a new addition
to the Committee's recommendations by giving definitions of "unitary
64 See Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
32 WEEKLY Corp. P s. Doc. 17 (April 24, 1996). The President signed the AEDPA with the
hope that the Supreme Court would interpret part of Chapter 153, 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (or
section 104(4)), not as a "strict liability" standard of review for habeas petitioners, but as a
fairer standard. President Clinton wrote:
I have signed this bill because I am confident that the Federal courts will interpret
these provisions to preserve independent review of Federal legal claims and the bed-
rock constitutional principle of an independent judiciary ... section 104(4) is not
triggered when some factor that is not fairly attributable to the applicant prevented
evidence from being developed in State court. Preserving the Federal courts' author-
ity to bear evidence and decide questions of law has implications that go far beyond
the issue of prisoners' rights. Our constitutional ideal of a limited government that
must respect individual freedom has been a practical reality because independent
Federal courts have the power 'to say what the law is' and to apply the law to the
cases before them. I have signed this bill on the understanding that the courts can
and will interpret these provisions of section 104 in accordance with this ideal.
Id.
65 See id.
66 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-66 (1996).
67 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2261 with Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3241-42.
68 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2262 with Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3242-43.
69 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2263 with Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3244.
70 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2264 with Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3245.
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review," "post-conviction review," and "direct review," as well as giving
another description of how counsel should be appointed.71 Fourth, 28
U.S.C. § 2266 adds to the Committee recommendations by stating that
the 180-day limit applies to prisoners' initial petitions, successive peti-
tions, and any petitions following remand by a court of appeals or the
Supreme Court.72 No amendments are allowed except when grounds
from 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) apply.73 Further, 28 U.S.C. § 2266 articulates
factors for determining whether an extension of time should be given
under 2263(b)(3) and commands courts of appeals to render final deci-
sions on petitions no later than 120 days after the last brief is filed. 74
Finally, note that the Committee's section 2260 - which eliminated the
requirement that a prisoner receive a certificate of probable cause for a
first appeal - was wholly rejected by Congress when it adopted Chapter
154.75
Despite the aforementioned modifications made by Congress, the
basic plan of the Powell Committee remains intact in the AEDPA. If
states create and adopt a system for appointing qualified counsel for cap-
ital prisoners, they opt-in to the benefits of enforcing 180-day time limits
for filing petitions, restricting the ability to amend petitions by preclud-
ing defaulted claims, and giving petitions constrained, unitary review by
enforcing time limits for decisions by the districts courts and courts of
appeal. Salient questions, however, remain unanswered. For example,
what type of system must a state have to opt-in? What requirements are
necessary for counsel to be "qualified" to handle post-conviction cases?
And how should prisoners respond when a state does not offer an ade-
quate system of qualified counsel, but attempts to enforce Chapter 154
anyway?
Troy Ashmus, a death row inmate in California, faced such a situa-
tion.76 Ashmus wanted to challenge the State of California's claim that it
successfully met the requirements to opt-in.77 He sought a ruling on
whether California in fact met the requirements before he filed his peti-
tion, so he could determine what claims to make in his petition and
whether he had six months or a year to file it.78
71 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2265 with Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3241-45.
72 28 U.S.C. § 2265(c) also states that the tolling of the 180 days will not begin until a
transcript of the trial proceedings is available to the prisoner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2265(c)-(d).
73 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2266 with Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3241-45.
74 See id.
75 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2261-66 with Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3245.
76 See discussion infra Part I.
77 See id.
78 See id.
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I. CALDERON v ASHMUS
A. THE LOWER CouRT's HOLDINGS AND RATIONALE
A jury in the State of California sentenced Ashmus to death in 1991
for felony murder.79 The Supreme Court of California affirmed his con-
viction and sentence on December 5, 1991. 80 Two years later, Ashmus
filed a pro se Application for Appointment of Counsel for his federal
habeas corpus proceeding as well as a Request for Stay of Execution.8'
Counsel was not appointed until August of 1995,82 and Ashmus and his
counsel planned on filing his final petition for habeas review by August
2, 1996. California, however, claimed it met the requirements to opt-in
to the expedited review procedures established by Chapter 154,83 which
meant that Ashmus would have to file the final petition by January of
1996 and would be forced to "guess as to whether and how Chapter 154
may constrain [his] ability to seek redress in the federal courts for depri-
vations of [his] constitutional rights." 84 Additionally, Ashmus would
forfeit his rights under Chapter 153 pursuant to California's claim that it
met Chapter 154.85
Ashmus filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the applica-
tion of Chapter 154's expedited review provisions to his conviction. 86
Using the suit as a ticket to federal court, Ashmus became the class rep-
resentative of the approximately 438 other California death row inmates,
many of whom were awaiting appointment of counsel.8 7 Ashmus sought
a declaratory judgment that California did not meet the requirements to
opt-in to Chapter 154.88 In addition to holding that death row prisoners
satisfied requirements for certification as a class for a class action suit,
79 People v. Ashmus, 54 Cal.3d 932, 2 Cal.Rptr. 2d 112, 820 P. 2d 214 (Cal. 1991),
reh'g den., Jan. 29, 1992, cert. den., 506 U.S. 841 (1992). Ashmus was also found guilty of
raping a child less than 14 years of age, sodomy, and lewd or lascivious conduct. See id.
80 See id.
81 See Ashmus v. Calderon, No. 93-0594 (N. Dist. Cal.); see also Special Requirements
for Capital Habeas Corpus Petitioners, N. DisT. CAL. C.P.R. 298-8(b) (stating that a capital
prisoner's pro se application for appointment of counsel and temporary stay of execution is
technically a petition for writ of habeas corpus with leave to amend the petition when counsel
is appointed); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 2572-73 (1994) (concluding
that a "post-conviction proceeding" within the meaning of [21 U.S.C.] § 848(q)(4)(B) is com-
menced by the filing of a death row defendant's motion requesting appointment of counsel for
his federal habeas corpus proceeding").
82 Ashmus v. Calderon, 935 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 1996), aff'd, 123 F.3d 1199
(9' Cir. 1997), rev'd sub. nom. Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
83 See Ashmus, 935 F. Supp. at 1056 (listing statutes under which California claimed to
have a "comprehensive scheme of interlocking, cross-implementive provisions").
84 Id. at 1056-57.
85 See id.
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (allowing an action for a person who is deprived of any "rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws").
87 See Ashmus, 935 F. Supp. at 1054.
88 See id.
2000] THE OPTION NOT TAKEN
the district court held that Chapter 154 should not apply to prisoners in
California.89 The court held that Chapter 153, allowing a one-year stat-
ute of limitations and non-unitary review procedures, applied.90 Accord-
ing to the court, California neither established nor met mandatory
guidelines for counsel required under 154.91
The court held that state statutes for the appointment and compensa-
tion of competent counsel in unitary review proceedings were objectively
deficient for several reasons.92 First, California's standards for counsel
failed to satisfy Chapter 154's requirements. The standards-were not ar-
ticulated in a rule of court or statute, nor were they mandatory. More-
over, they were substantively insufficient93 - knowledge of habeas law
was not required to handle post-conviction litigation. 94 Second, Califor-
nia's offer of counsel was not bona fide since in many cases the state
failed to appoint counsel after the prisoners had accepted the state's ini-
tial offer of counsel.95 Third, appointed counsel's duties were "limited to
an investigation of potentially meritorious grounds for habeas corpus
89 See id. at 1062, 1075.
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
93 See Ashmus, 935 F. Supp. at 1072. The Court explains that California tried to give
"post hoc rationalizations" for an old system (which did not include mandatory or official
rules/statutes) rather than take positive action on a new system as Congress intended; the state
argued that they satisfied the counsel requirement through Section 20 of the "Standards of
Judicial Administration Recommended by the Judicial Council." Id. (emphasis added). Sec-
tion 20 states that every "appellate court, when establishing and maintaining lists of qualified
counsel for appointment in criminal appeals ...should follow the guidelines in this sec-
tion . I..." d. (emphasis added). The guidelines list minimum qualifications for handling
death penalty cases as:
(1) actively practicing law for four years in California state courts or equivalent
experience; (2) attendance at three approved appellate training programs, including
one program concerning the death penalty; (3) completion of seven appellate cases,
one of which involves a homicide; and (4) submission of two appellants' opening
briefs written by the attorney, one of which involves a homicide, for review by the
court or administrator.
Id.
94 The fact that California does not require counsel to have experience with or knowl-
edge of habeas corpus law is significant, not only because the goal of the plan is to speed up
litigation by appointing qualified counsel to handle habeas petitions, but also because habeas is
one of the most complex areas of law. See "You Don't Have To Be a Bleeding Heart,"
Representing Death Row: A Dialogue Between Judge Abner J. Mikvah and Judge John C.
Godbold, HuMAN Rirrs, Winter 1987, 22, 24 (Judge Godbold explains that "[tihe average
trial lawyer, no matter what his or her experience, doesn't know any more about habeas than
he does about atomic energy... [Habeas] is the most complex area of law I deal with."). But
cf. Ashmus, 123 F.3d at 1208 (arguing that although habeas law is complex, a standard requir-
ing knowledge of habeas law should not be adopted because it would exclude "many lawyers
who could competently represent a condemned prisoner").
95 See Ashmus, 935 F. Supp. at 1074-75. California had offered counsel to 130 inmates
who accepted the offers, but California failed to officially "appoint" the counsel promptly after
the prisoners' acceptance, which runs counter to 28 U.S.C. § 2261(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 2265(b).
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which have come to counsel's attention in the course of preparing the
appeal." 96 In other words, unless a collateral claim could be gleaned
from the appellate record, it was not eligible for investigation or compen-
sation in California.97 This procedure directly conflicts with 28 U.S.C.
§ 2265(a)'s requirement that a unitary review procedure must allow pris-
oners to raise all collateral attacks on direct review and the state must
provide reasonable compensation for the expenses of an investigation of
those collateral attacks.98
Ultimately, the court held that declaratory relief was appropriate be-
cause the prisoners satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunc-
tion.99 The court reasoned that the state's threats to invoke Chapter 154
were costing prisoners their rights under Chapter 153, and without in-
junctive relief, the state would continue to assert that Chapter 154 ap-
plied.100 The court also issued a preliminary injunction declaring that the
State of California was restrained from trying to obtain the benefits of
Chapter 154 for California, and granted prisoners a stay to appeal to the
Ninth Circuit.' 10
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's
ruling. 10 2 The Court first rejected the State of California's defenses. Be-
cause the prisoners could identify a "continuing or impending violation
of the law," the Court held that Ashmus' action satisfied the exception to
Eleventh Amendment immunity as established in Ex Parte Young.10 3 In
addition, the prisoners had a sufficient "case or controversy" as required
for relief under both the Declaratory Judgment Act and Article I of the
Constitution.' °4 Ashmus proved that California's threats to invoke expe-
dited review of Chapter 154 would "significantly affect the plaintiff
class' ability to obtain habeas corpus review by a federal court." 10 5 The
96 Id. at 1071 (quoting In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 Cal.Rpt.2d 509, 531, 855 P.2d 729,
751 (1993)).
97 See id. at 1074; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2265(a).
98 See Ashmus, 935 F. Supp. at 1074.
99 See id.
See id. at 1075.
100 See id.
101 See id.
102 See Ashmus, 123 F.3d at 1209.
103 Id. at 1204. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
104 Ashmus, 123 F.3d at 1206-07.
105 Id. The Court continues:
[Ashmus] demonstrated that the class members may be forced to immediately file
bare-bones petitions to comply with the six-month filing deadline under Chapter
154. There is no guarantee that, after filing such a bare bones petition, a district
court will allow its amendment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(3)(B). By having to file
an immediate federal habeas petition, class members may waive or fail to suffi-
ciently develop meritorious claims.
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Court held that California did not meet Chapter 154's standards of com-
petency and compensation of appointed attorneys in death penalty cases
adopted by its court of last resort necessary for California to qualify for
154's limitations on habeas review.10 6 Ultimately, the Court affirmed
both the declaratory judgment and grant of preliminary injunctive re-
lief.'07 The United States Supreme Court granted the State of Califor-
nia's petition for a writ of certiorari. 10 8
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING AND RATIONALE
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 109 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion, holding that death row prisoners' § 1983 suits for declaratory
judgment should be dismissed because they did not satisfy the "case or
controversy" requirement set forth in Article I.110 The majority rea-
soned that although the Declaratory Judgment Act permits federal courts
to award relief in cases that fall outside the constitutional definition of an
Article Il "case," the Court could not grant Ashmus relief because he
did not bring a controversy before the Court."' The Court characterized
the instant case as a hypothetical dilemma through which Ashmus at-
tempted to secure an anticipatory ruling in advance of the habeas pro-
ceeding." 2 Such a ruling, the Court reasoned, would effectively preempt
potential affirmative defenses for the state before they arise in the habeas
action. According to the Court, the suit was an improper attempt on
Ashmus' part to "gain a litigation advantage by obtaining an advance
ruling on an affirmative defense."" 3
The majority further noted that a ruling in the instant case would not
resolve the prisoner's whole case; it would merely resolve a collateral
issue governing aspects of pending or future habeas suits." 4 Further-
more, the majority held that allowing Ashmus' suit would allow prison-
ers to obtain a declaration without meeting the requirement of exhausting
106 Judge Beezer alone dissented, stating that the prisoners' action did not satisfy the
requirements of Ex Parte Young. See id. at 1207-09.
107 See id. at 1209.
108 See Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 (1998).
109 See id. at 741.
11o Id. at 746-49; see also U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2. See generally WILLIAM B. LOCK-
HART, ET. AL., CONSTITUnONAL LAW 1506-48 (8' ed. 1996) (discussing the doctrine sur-
rounding Article III's "case or controversy" requirement); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CoNsTIrUTONAL LAW: PRiNC]PLEs Ar Potucms 46-116, 137-63 (1997).
111 Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994) (stating that in "a case of actual
controversy within its jurisdiction .... any court of the United States ... may declare the rights
and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not fur-
ther relief is or could be sought").
112 See Ashmus, 523 U.S. at 746-48.
113 Id. at 747.
114 See id. at 747-48.
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all of their state appeals.1 15 The Court thus concluded that prisoners
must exhaust all of their state appeals before going to federal court,
where they may argue the Chapter 154 issue during regular habeas pro-
ceedings. 116 Significantly, the Court stated that "[a]ny risk associated
with resolving the question in habeas, rather than a preemptive suit, is no
different from risks associated with choices commonly faced by
litigants." 117
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Souter
joined, added that some petitioners should be able to obtain a relatively
quick judicial answer to the 154 compliance questions for the purpose of
providing legal guidance to other similarly situated prisoners.118 Breyer
suggested that a "test case" could resolve repetitive litigation. He further
explained that such test cases are important because in some states, the
issue of whether a prisoner can amend a bare bones habeas petition most
likely turns on whether the state qualifies as an opt-in state. 119 Finally,
Breyer suggested that a District Court's answer to the 154 issue may be
challenged through interlocutory appeals. 120
a In short, Ashmus stands for the proposition that in order to challenge
a state's claim of meeting the opt-in requirements, prisoners must file a
federal habeas petition even if they do not have officially appointed
counsel, they do not know which statute of limitations applies, and they
are unsure of which claims must be included in the petition. Only by
filing a federal habeas petition may a prisoner argue that the state does
not meet the statutory requirements to opt-in.
How has the Supreme Court's ruling in Ashmus impacted capital
prisoners in various states? 121 Have states decided "test cases" to pro-
vide prisoners with answers to their 154 challenges? The next section
will examine these questions.
115 See id. (explaining that the basic rationale for the exhaustion requirement is to prevent
federal courts from having to wait on state courts, since federal suits may depend on state
courts' final judgments); see also Presier v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-91 (1973) (holding
that claims by prisoners regarding their confinement must be brought under habeas law, but
only after exhausting state claims).
116 See Ashmus, 523 U.S. at 747-48.
117 Id. at 748. But cf supra note 7 and accompanying text (inferring that one of the risks
associated with waiting to resolve the question in habeas litigation is execution without an
effective appeal).
118 See Ashmus, 523 U.S. at 750.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 An in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis would be worthwhile; how-
ever, it is beyond the scope of this article. The remainder of this Article will focus on Ashinus'
effects on states, and its implications.
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Ill. A POST-ASHMUS REPORT ON THE STATES
A. STATES THAT HAVE DISCUSSED CHAPTER 154 AFTER ASHMUS
Following the Ashmus decision on May 26, 1998, several federal
habeas cases have addressed the states' eligibility to opt-in to Chapter
154.122 States that have decided these cases include North Carolina, Illi-
nois, South Carolina, Virginia and Maryland. 123 In several instances,
Chapter 154 is an issue courts have chosen not to reach. For example,
the Fourth Circuit, in discussing a North Carolina case, merely men-
tioned Chapter 154 in a footnote, stating "the State does not maintain that
it has satisfied the opt-in requirements of § 107 [Chapter 154] such that
those provisions of the AEDPA apply."'124 Similarly, in Illinois, a Dis-
trict Court stated that "the respondent [the State] has not advised the
court whether Illinois is an 'opt-in' state under 28 U.S.C. § 2261 [Chap-
ter 154]." '125
Two states have reluctantly admitted their ineligibility after multiple
attempts to opt-in. In a South Carolina case, the Fourth Circuit noted
that although South Carolina had previously "purport[ed] to have satis-
fied the opt-in provisions - the State is not arguing that the provisions of
§ 107 . . . of the AEDPA apply."' 26 Likewise, Virginia, having once
attempted to opt-in, reaffirmed its 1996 decision in a footnote, stating
that "the specific provision of § 107 of the AEDPA, however, [are] not
applicable ... Virginia does not meet the qualifications of § 107, thus
precluding its applicability to this case."'127
Only one state, Maryland, has invoked the "test case" idea articu-
lated in the Ashmus concurrence, perhaps because Maryland was one of
the states where death row prisoners engaged in the § 1983 suit.128 A
Maryland capital prisoner, Eugene Colvin-El, filed a habeas corpus peti-
tion after the six-month deadline, and the state argued that his petition
was barred because it had not been filed within the 180-day time limit
Maryland had by opting-in to Chapter 154.129 In a lengthy opinion, the
Court explained why the petition could proceed on its merits and why
Maryland did not meet the requirements to opt-in. 130
122 See infra notes 124-40 and accompanying text. Courts commonly refer to Chapter
154 as § 107 of the AEDPA.
123 See hifra notes 124-40 and accompanying text.
124 Sexton v. French, 163 F.3d 874, 876 n.1 (4"h Cir. 1998).
125 United States v. Ryan, No.97-C2067 1998 WL 892756 at *1 n.3 (N.D. Ill. May 28,
1998).
126 Johnson v. Moore, 164 F.3d 624, 1998 WL 708691, at *1 n. 2 (4h Cir. Sept. 24, 1998).
127 Ramdass v. Angelone, 28 F. Supp.2d 343, 361 n.9 (E.D. Va. 1998).
128 See discussion infra Part IIIA.
129 See Colvin-El v. Nuth, NO.CIV.A.AW 97-2550 1998 WL 386403, at *1 (D. Md. July
6, 1998).
130 See id.
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First, the Court held that Maryland does not reasonably compensate
the attorneys who take post-conviction appeals. 31 Though there was
some disagreement as to the exact amount of attorney compensation, it
was approximated that post-conviction appellate attorneys receive $30 an
hour, with expenses capped at $6,250 for appeals. 132 Further, if the over-
head of running a law office is more than $50 an hour, as the Court
approximated, capital post-conviction attorneys are "compensated at a
rate substantially below the break-even point of doing business .... -133
Second, the Court held that Maryland's standards of attorney com-
petence are inadequate.134 Maryland claimed to meet these requirements
because their basic statutory competence standards were expanded in a
Maryland Regulation, which requires that attorneys have "participated in
a circuit court in at least two capital cases where the maximum penalty
was 10 years imprisonment or more."'135 In addition to the fact that this
regulation requires no knowledge of the extreme complexity in habeas
corpus law, the Court ruled that the regulation was enforced in an ad hoc
manner that did not ensure attorney competence.136
Finally, the Court held that Maryland did not satisfy its obligation to
follow procedures and appoint counsel in a specific manner as required
by Chapter 154.137 The Court reasoned that procedure is important be-
cause it safeguards against improper denial of counsel, and establishes a
commencement date for the automatic 180-day stay under Chapter
154.138 Maryland took an average of 10.59 months to appoint counsel,
and since Chapter 154 requires that the six-month time limit begin in
every case following final affirmation on direct appeal, the Court con-
cluded that the offer of counsel was not meaningful.1 39
Given the Court's comprehensive analysis, it seemed likely that
Colvin-El would authoritatively decide the opt-in issue for future Mary-
land courts. A Maryland District Court, however, addressed the issue
again in Oken v. Nuth,140 a case with different facts but the same result-
131 See id. at *3.
132 See id. at*3-*4.
133 Id. at *4.
134 See id. at *5-*6.
135 Id. at *5; see also MD. REG. CODE. tit. 14.06.02.05B, 1.
136 Colvin-El v. Nuth, NO. CIV. A. AW 97-2520, 1998 WL 386403, at *5- *6 (defining
the "ad hoc system" in Maryland as a random system where the Office of the Public Defender
recruits people whom they believe to be "well known in the legal community" for post-convic-
tion representation).
137 See id. at *8.
138 See id., see also 28 U.S.C. § 2261(c).
139 See Colvin-El v. Nuth, NO. CIV. A. AW 97-2520, 1998 WL 386403, at *8; see also
28 U.S.C. § 2263 (stating that the six month time limit must begin following a final decision
on direct appeal); Hill v. Butterworth, 941 F. Supp. 1129, 1147 (N.D. Fla. 1996) ("[a]ny offer
of counsel pursuant to Section 2261 must be a meaningful offer.").
140 30 F. Supp.2d 877, 879-80 (D. Md. 1998).
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Maryland is not an opt-in state.141 Steven Oken, the plaintiff in Booth v.
Maryland'42 had his habeas corpus petition deferred for almost two years
while the court awaited the outcome of whether prisoners could bring
§ 1983 suits to resolve the 154 issue. Finally, pursuant to the Supreme
Court's Ashmus decision, the Maryland Court adopted the earlier reason-
ing of the Booth opinion. 143
The Court held that Maryland does not meet the opt-in requirements
for three key reasons: (1) it does not have codified competency standards
for post-conviction counsel; (2) the compensation rates for counsel are
inadequate; and (3) the reimbursable amounts are not enough to increase
the compensation to a reasonable level.144 Thus, Maryland has been the
only state in the post-Ashmus period to follow the Supreme Court's ad-
vice and resolve the Chapter 154 issue through habeas litigation. 145 Prior
to the Ashmus ruling, however, several states concluded that their sys-
tems are inadequate to opt-in to Chapter 154.146
B. OTHER STATES THAT HAVE ADDRESSED CHAPTER 154 IssuEs
To date, no state has successfully opted-in to Chapter 154. Of the
38 states that have the death penalty, 147 thirteen clearly attempted to opt-
in to Chapter 154 before Ashmus but failed because they do not meet the
"quo" in the "quid pro quo" system.148 For instance, when California
and Florida tried to opt-in, the courts held that the states had inadequate
requirements for competency of counsel, and that a backlog of unrepre-
sented defendants demonstrated that there was not a bona fide offer of
counsel to all state prisoners. 149 Similarly, Ohio was reprimanded for
141 See id. at 877, 879-80.
142 See id. at 879.
143 See id. at 880 (stating that "[t]here is little need to recast Chief Judge Motz's analysis
in Booth because this Court... is in virtually total agreement with that analysis").
144 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2261.
145 See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
146 See discussion infra Part IB.
147 See Death Penalty Information Center, State By State Death Penalty Information (last
modified January 1, 2000) <http:lwww.essential.orgldpic/firstpage.html> (visited April 18,
2000). States that currently have the death penalty as a sentencing option include: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Ii-
nois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana. Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Some states carry out executions with relative fre-
quency (such as Texas, Florida, and Virginia), whereas other states have death row populations
but have not carried out executions in many years (such as South Dakota, Connecticut, and
New York).
148 See discussion infra Part IB.
149 See Hill v. Butterworth, 941 F. Supp. 1129, 1140-44 (N.D. Fla. 1996); Ashmus, 935 F.
Supp. at 1048. California continues to assert that it is an opt-in state. Personal Interview with
John H. Blume, Habeas Assistance and Training Project Counsel (consultants to Defender
20001
626 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9:607
allowing public defenders discretion to deny counsel, for allowing the
appointment of trial or appellate counsel in post-conviction proceedings,
and for not having a mandatory appointment system. 150 Ohio's compen-
sation and competency standards for counsel were also found to be inad-
equate. 151 Nebraska's system allowed courts to fail to appoint counsel in
post-conviction proceedings. 152 Virginia could not meet Chapter 154's
requirements because it had a "loose collection of statutes and regula-
tions" rather than a "comprehensive mechanism"; 153 their collection of
statutes neither provided for compensation and reimbursement of litiga-
tion nor required the state to offer counsel to all death row inmates.' 54
Additionally, Idaho, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Montana, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas have all failed to opt-in. l55
Louisiana was unable to opt-in because it had no standards for counsel at
all. 156 Furthermore, several other states have suggested that they do not
meet the requirements of Chapter 154, including Alabama, Arizona,
Georgia, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Washington. 157
IV. WHY STATES ARE UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO OPT-IN
States have been unwilling or unable to opt-in to Chapter 154
largely because of problems with Chapter 154 itself. The problems di-
vide into two general categories: inefficacy and ambiguity.
Services Committee of the United States courts); Director, Cornell Death Penalty Project and
Visiting Professor of Law (Nov. 5, 1999) ("In over 50 cases in California, the Attorney Gen-
eral has lost on whether California is an opt-in jurisdiction. It continues to raise the issue in
every case.").
150 See Mills v. Anderson, 961 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Scott v. Anderson, 958 F.
Supp. 330 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Hamblin v. Anderson, 947 F. Supp. 1179 (N.D. Ohio 1996);
Zuern v. Tate, 938 F. Supp. 468 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
151 See note 150 and accompanying text.
152 See Ryan v. Hopkins, No. 4CV95-3391, 1996 WL 539220, at *4 (D. Neb. July 31,
1996).
153 Wright v. Angelone, 944 F. Supp. 460, 468 (E.D. Va. 1996).
154 See Satcher v. Netherland, 944 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Va. 1996).
155 See Carter v. Johnson, 110 F.3d 1098, 1103-04 (5' Cir. 1997); Death Row Prisoners
of Pennsylvania v. Ridge, 106 F.3d 35 (3d Cir. 1997) (concession by state); Langford v. Day,
110 F.3d 1380, 1386 n.2 (9"h Cir. 1996); Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261, 1267 (5' Cir. 1996),
vacated on other grounds, 105 F.3d 209 (5" Cir. 1996); Burris v. Parke, 95 F.3d 465 (7"' Cir.
1996) (en banc); Thomas v. Gramley, 951 F. Supp. 1338 (N.D. 111. 1996); Leavitt v. Arave,
927 F. Supp. 394 (D. Idaho 1996); Rahman v. Bell, 927 F. Supp. 262 (M.D. Tenn. 1996);
Austin v. Bell, 927 F. Supp. 1058 (M.D. Tenn. 1996); Schlup v. Bowersox, No. 4:92CV443
JHC (E.D. Mo. 1996) (unpublished); Noland v. Dixson, No. 3:88CV217-MU (W.D. N.C.
1996) (unpublished).
156 See Williams v. Cain, 942 F. Supp. 1088, 1092 (W.D. La. 1996).
157 See Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1273 n.3 (9"' Cir. 1998); Neeley v. Nagle, 138
F.3d 917, 922 (11"' Cir. 1998); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484 (9' Cir. 1997); Lockett v.
Puckett, 980 F. Supp. 201, 210 n.1l (S.D. Miss. 1997).
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A. INEFFICACY
By the time Chapter 154 became law, the judiciary had already sub-
stantially reconstructed habeas law with new decisions and rules, and
Chapter 153 effectively codified those decisions.'5 8 The problems with
habeas law, described by the Powell Committee as "unnecessary delay
and repetition," included delays caused by state court consideration of
federal claims, inefficiencies due to prisoners' non-compliance with fed-
eral and state procedure, and duplication associated with federal courts
considering claims that were previously rejected in state court.' 59
Delays were addressed in the passage of a procedural rule for
habeas cases, Rule 9(a), which authorized district courts to dismiss peti-
tions without considering their merits if the prisoner unduly delayed fil-
ing, thereby causing prejudice to the state.160 The ruling in Rose v.
Lundy161 lessened delays and prompted prisoners to aggregate their
claims for federal court, and held that district courts should dismiss an
entire petition if one claim in the petition had not been exhausted in state
court. 1
6 2
158 Chapter 153 of the AEDPA is largely redundant, simply repeating what courts have
already done. One potential explanation for the redundancy may be that the AEDPA was
largely a political product, passed by legislators who wanted credit for reforming the system
and showing constituents they are "tough on crime." See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle,
Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DuKE L.J. 1, 1 (1997). As Tushnet and
Yackle explain:
When the judicial train arrives at the station before the legislative one, there is little
reason to enact a statute from a policy standpoint. Nevertheless, there are often good
political reasons for doing so. Legislators will have built up an investment in the
issue and will want to claim credit for doing something about a problem to which
they have been calling public attention.
Id; see also Yackle, supra note 50, at 448 ('There is no justification for reading into Pub. L.
104-132 [the AEDPA] a dramatic transmutation of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction and
its place in the machinery of American justice.").
159 Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3239-40. See generally Tushnet &
Yackle, supra note 158. These problems are similar to that of "unnecessary delay and repeti-
tion" discussed by the Powell Committee Report. See discussion supra Part I.
160 See Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 158, at 6 (explaining that the "flexible rule discour-
aged procrastination, but avoided the difficulties of reconciling a rigid filing deadline with the
exhaustion doctrine's conflicting demand for deliberate delay"); see also Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 9(a) (printed following 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (1994).
161 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
162 See id. at 510. It is debatable whether 28 U.S.C. § 2264, allowing federal courts the
ability to hear a claim even when the claim has not been exhausted in state court, is the right
way to resolve the problem of delay. While 28 U.S.C. § 2264 may technically save more time
than the Rose doctrine, it also means that federal courts could be resolving something that state
courts are already in the process of resolving, which creates problems of inefficiency and
potential unfairness.
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The Supreme Court targeted efficiency problems in Wainwright v.
Sykes 163 and practically disallowed federal habeas claim when prisoners
had procedurally defaulted in past state court litigation. 164 Since then,
the Court has expanded this doctrine twice. First, in McCleskey v.
Zant,165 the Court disallowed claims not made in an initial federal peti-
tion, but brought in a later petition. 166 Second, in Keeney v. Tamayo-
Reyes,' 67 the Court limited federal evidentiary hearings, thereby effec-
tively disallowing claims which were raised in a timely manner in state
court but which had no facts presented to support them. 68
Finally, the Court addressed the problem of duplication in Teague v.
Lane.' 69 The Court held that "new rules" of constitutional law, which
had previously been unavailable for use in habeas cases, were not avail-
able to be used except in two very narrow circumstances.1 70 Moreover,
in Teague and subsequent cases, the Court created an expansive defini-
tion of what rules are "new"'171 - rules that imposed "new obligations" on
the government and rules that were not discussed in precedent when the
prisoner's conviction became final.172 Rules that solidified federal law
among lower courts1 73 and rules made by applying old precedents in a
new setting were also included.174
Teague was criticized as being overly broad; however, the Court
established the proposition that as long as a state court did not mal e a
blatant error in convicting a prisoner, a federal court would have to cre-
ate a brand new constitutional rule to find for the prisoner. 175 In other
words, as long as a state followed proper procedures in effectuating a
conviction, a federal court could not overturn the conviction.1 76
Chapter 153 of the AEDPA, in turn, codified many of these judicial
determinations. 177 For example, restrictions on evidentiary hearings
were addressed in § 2254(e), which states that courts will not hold evi-
dentiary hearings except when a claim relies on a new rule of constitu-
163 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
164 See id. at 87.
165 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
166 See id. at 470.
167 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
168 See id. at 5.
169 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
170 See id. at 309-13.
171 See id. (explaining that "new rules" that are allowed to be used are rules which deal
with the ability of the state to define behavior as criminal, and rules which profoundly affect
the process of finding the truth).
172 See id. at 301.
173 See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990).
174 See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 393-95 (1994).
175 See Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 158, at 11.
176 See id.
177 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-55 (1996).
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tional law or facts that could not previously have been discovered. 178
The standard of review for habeas petitions was also addressed in
§ 2254(d), which states that an application for a writ of habeas corpus
will not be granted unless a state's judgment of a claim is contrary to
"clearly established Federal law" or based upon an "unreasonable deter-
mination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court." 179 Furthermore, according to § 2255, successive motions will
only be considered if they contain newly discovered evidence of actual
innocence or involve a new rule of constitutional law that was previously
unavailable. 180
Thus, pursuant to these decisions, the Supreme Court targeted the
major problems of "unnecessary delay and repetition" identified by the
Powell Committee and formulated solutions that were later used in Chap-
ter 153.181 It follows that because courts have already made changes to
habeas law and Congress adopted those changes in Chapter 153, the only
advantage left for states in Chapter 154 is a six-month reduction for fil-
ing petitions. However, with Chapter 153 also requiring that habeas peti-
tions be filed within one year of the final affirmation of conviction, this
sole advantage is essentially abolished and Chapter 154 is rendered com-
pletely ineffective. 182 Cutting the filing time in half by using Chapter
154 does not provide substantial gains for the state, particularly given the
amount of money, time, and effort required to implement both counsel
requirements and a mandatory system of appointing counsel.' 8 3 More-
over, it is likely that many states consider the idea of making a prisoner
file within six months unrealistic. 184 Under Chapter 154, counsel ap-
pointed immediately following the state's final conviction decision
would be required to conduct a complete investigation of the case and
write a complex, comprehensive habeas motion within 180 days. 185 Sen-
ator Biden remarked:
If we are going to adopt this one bite-out-of-the-apple
approach, the single review provided in Federal court
must be as thorough as possible... Currently there is no
time limit whatsoever. I agree that there should be some
time limit on filing such petitions for otherwise a pris-
178 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1996).
179 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (1996).
180 See 28 U.S.C. §2255 (1996).
181 See supra notes 158-70 and accompanying text.
182 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (1996) (setting a one-year statute of limitations for all
habeas petitions).
183 See discussion supra Part III (discussing how difficult it is for states to opt-in).
184 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text (detailing the procedure of Chapter
154).
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oner with no incentive to speed the arrival [of] his state
execution might delay the filing of his claim indefinitely.
Six months, however, is too short a time for a qualified
counsel and presumably very busy attorney to drop what
other work he or she might be doing, conduct a thorough
investigation of the case, and prepare an appropriate fil-
ing for this one bite-out-of-the-apple. 186
B. AcmIGun'y
The AEDPA is redundant and Chapter 154 is ineffective, but more
important, Chapter 154 is simply not well written.187 Its language is too
vague and there are critical gaps that leave its meaning unclear. 188 For
example, while the Powell Committee argued that a lack of qualified
counsel poses a major problem in habeas corpus litigation and Chapter
154 requires states to have a system of appointing qualified counsel to
expedite review, Chapter 154 fails to recommend counsel standards for
states to adopt. 189 Senator Biden addressed this deficiency in the debates
about Chapter 154 and suggested that Chapter 154 adopt the minimum
qualified counsel standards from the procedure in Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1988.190
The AEDPA, including Chapter 154, developed from various polit-
ical maneuvers over many years. 191 As one commentator writes: "Propo-
nents often added new elements . . . without reexamining old
formulations in order to maintain an intellectually coherent whole. The
result ... is extraordinarily arcane verbiage that will require considerable
186 135 CoNG. REc. S13471-04 (1989) (statement of Sen. Biden).
187 See Yackle, supra note 50, at 381-82.
188 See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
189 Compare Powell Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3240 with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-
66 (noting that while the Powell Committee discusses insufficient counsel as one of the three
main problems of habeas corpus law, there is no mention of suggested counsel requirements in
the statute).
190 See 135 CONG. REc. S13471-04 (1989) (statement of Sen. Biden); see also Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001(q)(4)(B) & (q)(6), 102 Stat. 4181, 4393-94
(1988) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) & (q)(6) (1994). The statute states:
In any post-conviction proceeding under Section 2254 or 2255 of Title 28, United
States Code, seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, any defendant who is or
becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation or investigative, ex-
pert, or other reasonably necessary services shall be entitled to the appointment of
one or more attorneys ... If the appointment is made after the judgment, at least one
attorney so appointed must have been appointed to practice in the court of appeals
for not less than five years, and must have had not less than years experience in the
handling of appeals in the court in felony cases.
Id.
191 See generally Yackle, supra note 50, at 381.
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time and resources to sort out. '19 2 To illustrate, "direct review" is not
defined anywhere in the statute, even though its meaning is extremely
important; it determines when the statute of limitations begins to toll. 193
Similarly, it is unclear whether 28 U.S.C. § 2263 is really intended to
trigger the clock as soon as the state conviction is final, even though
counsel has not yet been appointed. Such a policy seems unjust. 194 Fi-
nally, although 28 U.S.C. § 2266 states that courts must render their
judgments in 180 days and courts cannot delay because of "general con-
gestion" in their calendars, it also states that the court cannot be penal-
ized in any way by failing to comply with the time limits.195
To summarize, Chapter 154 and the AEDPA are largely symbolic in
nature and contain significant problems of inefficacy and ambiguity. For
these reasons, Chapter 154 does not constitute good public policy, squan-
ders judicial resources, and wastes taxpayer dollars. 196 But is there any
way to salvage Chapter 154? Are there any improvements that might
encourage states to opt-in to Chapter 154?
C. THE FuTuRE OF CHAPTER 154
Most important, Congress should develop a prototype system on
which states could base their own systems of counsel appointments and
192 See id.
193 See id. at 387 (explaining that the term "direct review" will have to be interpreted
"within the context of each state's appellate system," and that "[o]ne key issue is likely to be
whether 'direct review' include certiorari proceedings in the Supreme Court").
194 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2263(a) ("[a]ny application... be filed... not later than 180
days after the final State court affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review") with Powell Committee Report, supra note
17, at 3244 (stating that the statute of limitations will run after the order is entered appointing
counsel). See also Yackle, supra note 50:
The provision specifies that the 180-day time period begins to run when direct re-
view is complete, but it neglects to say when the state must appoint counsel for post-
conviction litigation. It appears, then, that a prisoner's time can begin to run, and,
indeed, can even run out, before the state keeps its part of the bargain.
Id. at n.50.
195 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(1)(A) with 28 U.S.C. § 2263(C)(I)(3) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2264(4)(A). This discrepancy is especially disturbing when one considers the consequences
if certain jurisdictions were ultimately declared to be opt-in jurisdictions. For example, if
California were declared an opt-in jurisdiction tomorrow, the federal courts in the Central
District of California would virtually shut down. Personal Interview with John H. Blume,
Habeas Assistance and Training Project Counsel (consultants to Defender Services Committee
of the United States courts); Director, Cornell Death Penalty Project and Visiting Professor of
Law (Nov. 5, 1999) ("Every judge would have 3 to 4 habeas cases on his docket with more
coming in all the time - there are 700 plus people on death row in California - so all other
business would shut down for several years while judges tried to work through it.").
196 See, e.g., Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, Judicial Activism and Legislative "Re-
form" of Federal Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of Recent Developments and Current
Proposals, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1, 94 (1991) (arguing that adopting the Powell Committee's pro-
posed legislation will actually cause more complex, arbitrary decisions, and the failure of
courts to hold states to higher standards of counsel only increases delay in habeas litigation).
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requirements. 197 This prototype system would preserve the strong feder-
alist notions on which Chapter 154 is based, and would also provide
states with an idea of the system they need to opt-in.' 98 In the alterna-
tive, Congress could mandate that states follow the prototype system ex-
actly in order to opt-in. Although this prescription may diverge from
Rehnquist's ideas on federalism, it would simplify the procedure. By
decreasing the amount of time and money spent on developing a system,
a balance between state expenditures (finding and offering qualified
counsel) and state benefits (a faster, unitary review procedure) could be
maintained.
Until one of these two suggestions is implemented, states will con-
tinue to alter their counsel requirements until they get it right, the result
being more litigation in which states try to decide if they got close
enough to opt-in.199 The continuous litigation in Maryland, South Caro-
lina, Virginia, and California has demonstrated that the "test case" idea
proposed in the Ashmus concurrence does not work - states can change
(or not change) their systems regularly and argue again that they meet the
opt-in requirements. 200
Finally, the language of the AEDPA and Chapter 154 should be
clarified so that judicial resources are not wasted discussing definitions.
If the real aim of the AEDPA is to speed up post-conviction litigation,
then the words of the AEDPA itself should not constitute an issue for
litigants.
V. CONCLUSION
Significant changes have transpired in habeas corpus law in the four
years since the AEDPA's passage. Yet, in these years of change, not one
state has been able to take advantage of the "quo" in Chapter 154's "quid
pro quo" system. In fact, the legacy of Chapter 154 has merely been
more litigation in capital cases, the very conclusion judges and authors of
the AEDPA sought to prevent. Unless federal courts or the legislature
make some positive changes to jump-start the states into action, Chapter
154 will become even more ineffective in meeting the Powell Commit-
tee's goals.
197 See, e.g., Benjamin Robert Ogletree, Comment, The Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Chapter 154: The Key to the Courthouse Door or Slaughterhouse
Justice?, 47 CAmH. U. L. REv. 603, 667-73 (Winter 1998) (presenting a model bill that would
define counsel requirements and procedures necessary to opt-in to Chapter 154).
198 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
199 See discussion supra Part IV.
200 See discussion supra Part Ill.
